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In this article, I venture into a fairly underexplored area of African epistemic normativity. I 
seek to consider how the question of responsibility might be approached differently if values 
salient in African communitarian thinking are critically explored. I argue that while one may 
find almost a uniform framework for the determination of epistemic responsibility in different 
philosophical traditions based on the rational scheme, in the dominant African communitarian 
tradition, there is more to responsibility than just individualistic traits like rationality. My 
argument is based on the premise that, responsibility in African epistemological thinking is 
viewed from a communitarian perspective. According to this view, despite most of African 
communitarian knowledge conforming to the consciousness and control tests of the rational 
scheme, communitarian philosophy still remains cardinal in defining the aspect of 
responsibility on the part of both the individual and the community. I therefore partly make 
critical comparisons between a Western and African concept of responsibility as I seek to 
justify the plausibility of an African model of responsibility based on communitarian habits 
and culture.     
 
Introduction 
What does an African epistemological theory of normativity look like, and what does it say 
about the questions around epistemic responsibility? Should questions on epistemological 
theorising be considered from a universalist1 view such that we can have uniform conceptions 
on epistemological ideas like responsibility? It is not very clear whether different philosophical 
traditions have, or ought to have, uniform conceptions of epistemic responsibility. At the same 
time, the philosophical issues on African epistemic normativity, particularly the ideas around 
the question of responsibility have not received much attention in much of African 
philosophical writings. In this article, I venture into a novel interpretation of African epistemic 
normativity, attempting to consider what an African communitarian view of responsibility2 
look like as well as how it fundamentally differs from the dominant view of epistemic 
responsibility in much of Western philosophy.   
2 
 
In this article, I draw the conclusion that African epistemic normativity is grounded in African 
communitarian thinking as I focus on the epistemic norm of responsibility. As I consider and 
defend an alternative view of responsibility in African communitarian thinking, I will argue 
that the conception and determination of moral responsibility and accountability ought to be 
understood differently in different philosophical traditions. For example, I establish how 
African philosophical thinking places much emphasis on the communitarian criterion of 
responsibility as opposed to the dominant notions in non-African traditions like the Western 
view. I therefore provide strong reasons why the African view ought to be taken as more 
plausible that the Western view, which takes the aspect of responsibility to be solely dependent 
on the rational schema as determined by individual will and reason on the part of the individual 
person.  
Until recently, much of African epistemological theorising has focussed more on legitimising 
African epistemology. This is why Metz argues that “in the literature on African ethics, one 
finds little that consists of normative theorising with regard to right action” (Metz, 2007: 321; 
See also, Molefe, 2017a: 1). As a result, I argue that the issue of epistemic responsibility ought 
to be part of this mission of addressing African epistemological theorising. The aspect of 
African epistemic responsibility is also closely connected to moral responsibility and hence in 
need of further interrogation. Although “a post-colonial view of ethics has emerged in Africa 
based mainly on traditional indigenous knowledge systems” (Murove, 2009: xiv), my point of 
departure will be a close examination of the African epistemic view of responsibility from 
which the conception of ethical responsibility could be drawn within the African 
communitarian context.  
While I am more focussed on the African communitarian model of epistemic responsibility, I 
juxtapose it with the dominant view in Western philosophy where epistemic responsibility has 
more to do with human reason. Although I contend that the African communitarian conception 
of responsibility also takes into consideration the centrality of will and reason (the rational 
scheme) in the determination of responsible actions, I argue that these are not enough. In 
addition to will and reason, the communitarian ethos or voice is also important in the 
determination of epistemic responsibility. As a result, it is my argument that following the 
African communitarian model, individuals cannot just be responsible as individuals, they also 
need the community. (See also, Menkiti, 1984: 171-180; Behrens, 2010: 472 and Ikuenobe, 
2015: 1005-1007) The community plays a very central epistemological and moral role in 
inculcating what responsibility is, and how it ought to be understood and evaluated in 
community. Accordingly, the community ought to be responsible for knowledge of what 
individuals do because the community makes what the individual is.  
In espousing what I see as an African communitarian view of responsibility, I do not wish to 
pretend, or give the impression, that all the various and diverse communities in Africa have a 
similar conception of epistemic responsibility. However, I draw on those African 
communitarian societies that share fundamental opinions on fundamental issues. First, I 
attempt to define the aspect of epistemic responsibility as an important aspect of 
epistemological and moral thinking in general. I then examine what I see as the universalist 
fallacy in much of Western philosophical thinking. This is the thinking based on the assumption 
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that only human reason ought to be accountable for human epistemic responsibility. In the last 
section, I examine the communitarian view of responsibility that I glean from African 
communitarian philosophy. Here, I provide strong reasons why not only reason is responsible 
for human epistemic responsibility. Ultimately, I draw the conclusion that an African view of 
responsibility is communitarian and not individualist, as I compare it with what is prevalent in 
Western philosophical thinking.         
Understanding Epistemic Responsibility 
In general, responsibility is taken to be a very central normative status among all conscious 
human beings having control over their actions. In most cases, the aspect of responsibility is 
taken as both an epistemological and a moral aspect referring to the knowledge and kind of 
obligations which the individual or community ought to have as a result of either individual or 
communitarian acts on others. As he looks at responsibility as accountability, Thomas Bivins 
sees responsibility “as a bundle of obligations associated with a job or function” (Bivins, 2006: 
20). However, this common view and understanding of responsibility as accountability is also 
informed by the epistemic view of responsibility that considers responsible actions or moral 
responsibility to be a result of an epistemic disposition.  
Accordingly, knowledge, responsibility and morality could be taken to be closely connected to 
each other because they all have something to do with obligations and interests of others as 
well as the knowledge and duties which human beings ought to have in order to consider 
various moral acts as responsible and accountable. In much of ethical thinking, the aspect of 
responsibility is considered as closely connected to the conception and determination of moral 
responsibility and accountability. These aspects of responsibility and morality are considered 
as closely connected to each other because they are all understood within the context of creation 
of responsible moral acts, accountability, good relations, consideration of the interests of 
others, and cooperation and creating harmonious living among human communities. 
However, despite the above loose view and blanket approach to epistemic responsibility and 
moral responsibility, there is a distinction that ought to be made between epistemological 
responsibility and moral responsibility. As Kornblith sees it, “an epistemologically responsible 
agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have beliefs produced by processes which 
lead to true beliefs; his [or her]3 actions are judged by these desires” (Kornblith, 1983: 1). As 
a result, there must be a thin line but fundamental difference between epistemic responsibility 
and moral responsibility. However, when I loosely use the term ‘responsibility’ throughout this 
work, I mean more of the former than the latter although these are closely connected. I therefore 
do not wish to examine ethical responsibility, but epistemic responsibility from which the 
former could be drawn.      
While the notion of epistemic responsibility has been fairly addressed in much of Western 
philosophical discussions on ethical conduct, not much about it has been said in African 
epistemological and ethical thinking. This is why Gyekye argues that “like African philosophy 
itself, the ideas and beliefs of the African society that bear on ethical conduct have not been 
given elaborate investigation and clarification and, thus, stand in real need of profound and 
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extensive analysis and investigation” (Gyekye, 2013: 205). I therefore venture into this 
important aspect in the African conception of responsibility. My endeavour is supported by 
Murove’s argument that, “many scholars in sub-Saharan Africa have finally realised that the 
Western ethical tradition, which has for so long dominated sub-Saharan African society, is 
merely a particular way of understanding ethics relative to Western elites” (Murove, 2009: xiv).      
The Universalist Fallacy of Epistemic Responsibility       
There are various criteria used for assessing epistemic accountability or responsibility. Some 
of these include the assessment of human reason, the moral agent’s mental disposition, 
influence of society and other factors. However, a dominant view in much of Western 
philosophy has been the one following what I see as the rationalist scheme or approach to 
epistemic responsibility. This kind of scheme is mainly informed by the anthropocentric4 view 
of reality where human reason is seen as being central in determining what ought to be. 
Following the anthropocentric view of epistemic normativity, only individual human beings 
are considered as responsible for the determination of knowledge of responsible actions 
because of their reason and autonomy as individuals. Yet following Bellah’s argument, the 
individual does not exist as an island unto him/herself if the human community is properly 
understood (Bellah, 2009: 175-8).     
Ultimately, this anthropocentric approach to the aspect of epistemic responsibility that is 
characteristic of the dominant view in much of Western philosophical thinking can also be 
accused for propagating the view that only human reason is the sole determinant in terms of 
assessing the knowledge of responsible actions. As I have argued elsewhere,  
A dominant feature of Western philosophical thinking has been the emphasis on 
the importance of human reason as informed by the classical Socratic-Platonic and 
neo-Platonic philosophies, philosophical realism and the Cartesian philosophical 
traditions. These central philosophical traditions characterising and heavily 
influencing contemporary [Western] philosophical thinking are based on the basic 
Western traditional assumption that human reason alone is the fundamental source 
of our knowledge about the world (Chemhuru, 2014: 75).     
As I also argue here, this view is mainly responsible for shaping the reason-centred view of 
responsibility that characterises much of Western philosophical thinking. On the same grounds, 
this philosophical tradition can be interpreted to be grounding the epistemological view that 
human reason alone is central in the determination of responsible actions.    
Following on from the above epistemological assumption, a common view that is dominant in 
Western philosophy has been one that is centred on looking at responsibility from the rational 
scheme. Bivins traces this philosophical tradition to Aristotelian thinking and observes that “it 
is important to note that as early as Aristotle, moral responsibility was viewed as originating 
with the moral agent (decision maker), and grew out of an ability to reason (an awareness of 
actions and their consequences) and a willingness to act free from compulsion” (Bivins, 2006: 
20). According to this scheme, epistemic responsibility is assessed in terms of whether 
knowledge of actions and their performances have been done in accordance with the knowledge 
condition of responsibility or the control condition of responsibility. According to the 
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knowledge condition of responsibility, a moral agent is judged for the responsibility of the 
person’s actions on the basis of being aware of the moral act. In terms of the control condition, 
responsibility lies with the moral agent being in charge of things that are up to him/her. 
Accordingly, the aspect of responsibility of the person’s actions is generally examined in terms 
of whether moral agents satisfy the knowledge condition of responsibility and the control 
condition of responsibility. It is expected that actions can be viewed as responsible, if and only 
if they have satisfied both the knowledge condition and the control condition of responsibility.  
Knowing what one is doing and being in control of what is being done are mainly accepted as 
the universal view in the consideration of responsible actions. This view could be traced to 
ancient philosophical thinking along both Platonic and Aristotelian lines. Much of Western 
philosophical thinking seems to be influenced by the Platonic, Aristotelian as well as the 
Cartesian views of responsibility. According to these dominant views of responsibility, the 
individual person or moral agent is solely responsible for one’s actions because the person is 
taken as a res cogitans (a thinking thing) by virtue of having memory, will and imagination in 
the Cartesian sense. Responsibility is given to the person (P) on the basis of the rationality 
scheme. 
In this dominant view or tradition in Western philosophical thinking, one of the most influential 
approaches to epistemic responsibility is mainly centred on appeals to the rational scheme 
through the knowledge (consciousness) and control conditions of epistemic responsibility. This 
view has generally been taken and accepted as the universalist view of epistemic responsibility 
among all human beings. Aristotle is one of the philosophers who hold the view that all human 
beings are rational animals. Because of this view, all human beings therefore ought to be 
responsible for their individual human actions because they must be in possession of 
knowledge of their actions as well as being in control of whatever they do.   
I consider this view as the person-centric view of responsibility. It is person-centric because 
the aspect of responsibility comes back to the individual person by virtue of having 
individualistic quality of rationality. It is based on the assumption that reason gives the person 
(P) knowledge or consciousness of one’s actions in addition to control of one’s actions. As a 
result this view of responsibility can therefore be judged to be highly subjective and atomistic 
to the individual moral agent. Despite Kornblith’s view of such “accounts seeking to ground 
epistemic norms in our desires [as] most promising” (Kornblith, 1993: 357), I argue to the 
contrary, and seek to establish that this dominant view in the Western philosophical tradition 
makes epistemic norms such as epistemic responsibility to be some sort of a hypothetical 
imperative.5 This is because the moral obligations and knowledge of what one is doing are 
mainly dependent on, and determined by reference to, the moral agent as an individual being.     
The African Communitarian Perspective 
The alternative African perspectives on epistemic responsibility must be essentially tied to the 
African communitarian view of existence. A number of thinkers have so far offered various 
theories and perspectives explaining the way that existence is conceptualised in African 
philosophy as well as how it has an import to various epistemic and ethical discourses (see for 
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example, Tempels, 1959; Mbiti, 1969, Samkange and Samkange, 1980; Menkiti, 1984; 
Ramose, 1999; Gyekye, 1996; 2011; 2013; Matolino, 2011 and Molefe, 2017a; 2017b). Yet 
the communitarian view of epistemic responsibility is not discernible in most of these important 
works. This is why I intend to make a novel interpretation of the African communitarian view 
of existence in terms of how it informs a plausible view of epistemic responsibility.   
I argue that a conception of the African communitarian view of epistemic responsibility is 
mainly anchored in the understanding of the human person that permeates much of African 
philosophy and thought. Broadly understood, “the African view of man denies that persons can 
be defined by focussing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone 
individual. Rather man is defined by reference to the environing community” (Menkiti, 1984: 
174). Similarly, I seek to argue that this communitarian view of the person has a very strong 
bearing on the African conception of epistemic responsibility as I will establish in this section. 
My argument could perhaps address Metz’s reservations with African traditional knowledge 
as he expresses his fear in the following: “does taking testimony to be an independent source 
of knowledge entail that tradition and elders can provide good epistemic reason to believe an 
ethical claim?” (Metz, 2013: 8).   
Following African communitarian thinking, the dominant view of epistemic responsibility in 
African epistemology seems to espouse a communitarian view of epistemic responsibility as 
opposed to the subjectivist and atomist view that I have considered in the previous section as 
being characteristic of much of traditional Western philosophy. The African communitarian 
view of responsibility can be understood to be a collectivist approach to epistemic 
responsibility. This is because ‘knowledge of what one is doing’ or ‘knowledge of what one 
ought to do’ does not entirely and actively come from the individual moral agent alone. Rather, 
epistemic knowledge can sometimes be passively received from the community in the form of 
traditional or cultural knowledge6. Although Dzobo is not specific with epistemic knowledge, 
he offers a view of African traditional knowledge that is similar to my conception of African 
communitarian epistemic knowledge. According to Dzobo, “in indigenous society, then, 
knowing is the result of two different types of experience, one active and the other passive” 
(Dzobo, 2010: 74). In light of this kind of approach to traditional knowledge, one can 
reasonably argue that in the African communitarian view, traditional or cultural knowledge of 
responsibility ought to be taken as some sort of a categorical imperative, implying that the duty 
to responsible actions are not determined by the moral agent alone. The idea of epistemic 
responsibility within the African communitarian communities must therefore be understood as 
rather socialistic, in so far as it promotes a social or cultural morality of the common good of 
the community rather than looking at epistemic and moral responsibility from an individualist 
perspective. As he looks at issues in African Ethics, Gyekye takes this view as he argues that 
“African humanitarian ethics spawns social morality, the morality of the common good, and 
the morality of duty that is so comprehensive as to bring within its compass what are referred 
to as moral ideals” (Gyekye, 2011: 237). From this view, therefore, it is clear that culture plays 
a central role in the cultivation of knowledge and epistemic responsibility in African social 
epistemology. Accordingly, Jimoh observes that,  
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culture plays an important role in the mental understanding of reality and unless 
one is intimately familiar with the ontological commitments of a culture, it is often 
difficult to appreciate or otherwise understand those commitments. Therefore it is 
important that we understand the African cultural and ontological conceptions of 
reality to enable us to understand the African approach to knowledge (Jimoh, 2017: 
122).     
As a result, following the African traditional model through which individuals passively 
acquire the kind of traditional knowledge alluded to by Dzobo (2010: 71-82), one can say that 
the African communitarian approach to epistemic responsibility must be collectivist in outlook. 
Although Menkiti is not more focussed on the idea of epistemic responsibility, he suggests a 
view that helps us to understand a collectivist approach to epistemic responsibility when he 
argues; “group solidarity is most often cited as a key, perhaps the defining, feature of African 
traditional societies” (Menkiti, 2004: 324). Although this kind of radical communitarian 
thinking could be accused of “depart[ing] from the global sway of rights” (Molefe, 2017b: 1), 
this collectivist view in African epistemology, as informed by communitarian existence, 
epistemic responsibility does not entirely lie on the individual person alone. According to this 
communitarian view, rather, epistemic responsibility ought to be understood within the context 
in which the individual person forms an intertwine with the family and community at large, 
who also form sources of such traditional knowledge of responsibility. As a result, following 
this communitarian view of epistemic responsibility, the content, scope and agency of 
knowledge of moral actions and obligations are mainly derived and determined by the 
community, and not necessarily by the dictates of the lone individual. Although Matolino 
differs with Menkiti’s radical communitarianism, he also settles for this kind of 
“epistemological growth” that “involves the moral aspect of both the individual and society” 
(Matolino, 2011: 32). This view is mostly applicable to a communitarian conception where 
adults are responsible for inculcating certain epistemic norms to children as they grow from 
one stage to the other.        
In African communitarian existence, the ontological view and understanding of the person as 
communitarian has a very strong influence on the view of epistemic responsibility. This is why 
certain aspects of African communitarian dictates, behaviours, and attitudes may actually be 
determined by the one in control of the conditions for responsibility, in which case it is the 
community. In other words, it is possible for an individual moral agent or the individual human 
person to actually act without necessarily satisfying the knowledge condition of responsibility 
as well as the control condition of responsibility (in the traditional Western philosophical sense) 
without any problems. This view is not surprising when one considers Mbiti’s argument that, 
“whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the 
whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: I am because we are, and 
since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1969: 106). From this view, one can reasonably glean a 
deterministic understanding of epistemic responsibility as well. Accordingly, it is apparent that 
collective epistemic responsibility is more important than that of the individual in an African 
communitarian set-up. Unlike in the dominant view in the Western philosophical tradition, 
African communitarian knowledge of epistemic responsibility does not necessarily need the 
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knowledge condition and the control condition in order for the individual to be assessed in 
terms of responsibility.  
Following the African communitarian view of epistemic responsibility, it is possible that an 
individual might be compelled to accept and absorb certain knowledge of actions and do certain 
actions with some kind of impunity, while the community bears responsibility. In other words, 
there are exceptions where the community at large can bear responsibility on behalf of the 
individual because such knowledge of responsibility does not belong to the individual alone 
but to the family and community at large. For example, in holding on to knowledge of various 
taboos that are aimed at safeguarding communalistic values, individuals are not held 
responsible for certain actions that they may do, but the community bears such epistemic 
responsibility. Similarly, an individual might therefore fail the control condition of epistemic 
responsibility as an atomistic individual, but society might be the one in control of epistemic 
responsibility in that context. 
Also, closely knit with the communitarian understanding of existence as being more focussed 
on the communalistic view of epistemic responsibility is the notion of ubuntu. Although it is 
difficult to separate the notion of ubuntu from the communitarian view, they are different from 
each other. The notion of ubuntu is more focussed on the idea of existence and its epistemic 
and moral import mostly to communities in Southern Africa, while the communitarian view is 
broader in so far as it denotes the idea of how the individual is communally understood, and 
informed by closely associating with the community. I will spare a detailed discussion of the 
similarities and differences between these two concepts to some other space and time. I will 
simply conclude here, that the notions of ubuntu and communitarian philosophy are closely 
knit such that it is difficult to discuss one concept without the other (See Behrens, 2010: 467-
8). However, for the sake of this discussion, I will focus on the way in which ubuntu feeds into 
the communitarian view of epistemic responsibility. According to this view, the understanding 
of the individual has far-reaching implications for the communitarian understanding of 
epistemic responsibility. This is because the notion of ubuntu does not place epistemic 
responsibility on the person as an individual being, but the whole community as informed by 
ubuntu (See also Behrens, 2010: 468). According to Ramose, “the African concept of a person 
as wholeness does not deny human individuality as an ontological fact, as an analytic finitude, 
but ascribes ontological primacy to the  community through which the  human individual comes 
to know both themselves and the world around” (Ramose, 1999: 79). This view confirms the 
communitarian view of epistemic responsibility characteristic of African epistemology.          
Also, the African hierarchy of being or existence is another important determinant of the 
communitarian view of epistemic responsibility. According to this African ontological order 
of existence, existence is hierarchically understood in so far as the chain of beings stretches 
from the Supreme Being (God), the ancestors, human beings, other animate beings and nature 
in general (Teffo and Roux, 1998: 138; Chemhuru, 2014: 80-1). Understood correctly, this 
view of existence in African metaphysics cannot be compatible with an atomistic view of 
existence, and the rational scheme of epistemic responsibility like the one in Western 
philosophical thinking which emphasises individualistic traits like knowledge or consciousness 
of what one is doing and being in control of what is being done. Thus, contrary to such a 
9 
 
Western perspective, following the African order of existence, it is impossible to leave 
epistemic responsibility to the person without also taking into consideration other metaphysical 
aspects or beings such as the ancestors and the Supreme Being. This is because without these 
vitalist forces, existence would be incomplete. Similarly, responsibility or knowledge of what 
one is doing or control over one’s actions also rests on the same metaphysical premises in 
African communitarian philosophy. This explains why mostly, although it is important to know 
what one is doing, individuals may be spared from blame and responsibility from actions which 
they might have done consciously and under their control. According to the African 
metaphysical view of responsibility rather, other metaphysical forces like familial and ancestral 
spirits could be held accountable and responsible for such actions and not necessarily the 
individual person. This view of existence is captured in Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy 
where he alluded to the idea of ‘vital force’ as an important metaphysical concept of being 
among the Bantu people in the following manner:  
After [God] comes the first fathers of men, founders of the different clans. These 
arch-patriarchs were the first to whom God communicated his vital force, with the 
power of exercising their influences on all posterity. They constitute the most 
important chain binding men to God. They occupy so exalted a rank in Bantu 
thought that they are not regarded merely as ordinary dead (Tempels, 1959: 61-2).  
Although he was writing from a missionary and colonialist stand-point, this vitalist view 
accounting for epistemic responsibility remains true and useful among most African 
communitarian societies. Imafidon also captures this vitalist view of existence as he argues that 
“in a typical African ontology, there exists of two realms of existence, the visible and invisible; 
independently real but intrinsically linked to form a whole” (Imafidon, 2014: 38). 
Consequently, if existence is construed in this way, it is impossible to look at epistemic 
responsibility from an individualist perspective but rather from a collectivist view where both 
the living and the departed bear epistemic responsibility for human intentions and actions. This 
is why in An African Theory of Epistemology, Jimoh comes to the conclusion that “for the 
African there is more to reality than what is within the realm of empirical inquiry” (Jimoh, 
2017: 122).  
Overall, within the African social and political context, the aspect of epistemic responsibility 
ought to be understood as closely related to morality or ethical thinking especially as it relates 
to how human beings are socially connected to each other within the various African 
communities. According to this communitarian view of epistemic responsibility and morality, 
a person can therefore be considered as being responsible for actions that only have moral or 
ethical import to other social human beings to which the individual relates with. At the same 
time, it must also be understood that the same individual person being held for such 
responsibility is naturally a social animal (See Gyekye, 1996: 55). Consequently, if we accept 
the natural sociality of the person and persons in African ontology, an individual person cannot 
be held to be responsible for one’s actions because he/she is not understood as a moral island. 
The individual exists within, and is influenced by one’s social context such that it is difficult 
to separate one’s decisions and actions from those of the community. Accordingly, Gyekye 
argues that “morality is intrinsically social, arising out of the relations between individuals; if 
there were no such thing as human society, there would be no such thing as morality” (Gyekye, 
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1996: 55). As opposed to the Western conception of responsibility that puts strong emphasis 
on human reason alone, within the African metaphysical view, there is more to the 
determination of responsibility than just reason. If African metaphysical conceptions of reality 
are closely examined, one can glean a reasonable view of responsibility that respects both 
human reason and existence, particularly communitarian existence. What is unique about this 
view of responsibility is the attempt to go further than individual reason of the human person, 
as it also takes into consideration the role of the metaphysical status of the individual and the 
society at large. Although Chemhuru is more concerned with the import of African existence 
to environmental ethical thinking, he alluded to a communitarian view of responsibility in the 
following: “As complement to reason for example, among the Shona and most African 
communities, various insights, which are part of their metaphysics constitute sources of Shona 
and most of sub-Saharan environmental epistemology and axiology” (Chemhuru, 2014: 75). 
Conclusion 
What I attempt to do here is to examine the aspect of epistemic responsibility as an alternative 
view emanating from African communitarian philosophy. Although I do not wish to commit 
the fallacy of assuming that all African communities follow the kind of communitarian 
epistemic view of responsibility that I examine here, I seek to confine my argument to African 
communities that are communitarian in orientation. I conclude that these communities largely 
exhibit a different understanding of responsibility from much of non-African traditions such as 
Western philosophy. This would explain why I argue and conclude that the aspect of 
responsibility ought to be conceptualised and understood differently by different people. 
Notwithstanding my argument for a communitarian conception of epistemic responsibility in 
African philosophy, I also caution against the temptation to imply that African communitarian 
philosophy totally dismisses the knowledge condition of epistemic responsibility and the 
control condition of responsibility on the part of the individual. While the individual human 
being remains an integral part of the communitarian arrangement, he/she still has some claim 
to individuality such that it is sometimes possible to evaluate the person individually.    
1 I consider the universalist standpoint to be a view-point that considers philosophical issues from a common 
stand-point or view, such that any human being will ultimately have a similar conception of a fundamental issue.  
2 By this, I mean a view of ethical responsibility that is mainly informed by the community to which the individual 
person is immersed. This Afro-communitarian view is in contrast to the Western conception of responsibility that 
mainly focuses on the autonomy of the person without considering the person’s communitarian relationships.   
3 My insertion.  
4 The word anthropocentric here could be understood within the context in which human beings are thought to 
exist with other non-human beings around them, such as God, other gods, non-human nature and all reality around. 
However, the general anthropocentric view ignores all these in terms of approaching fundamental questions about 
reality. Only the human being is thought to be the central and most important being in the universe. This is why 
it is referred to as the anthropocentric view because its main focus is on the human being as opposed to other non-
anthropocentric view like the eco-centric approach which takes on board, the entire ecosystem.  
5 I use the phrase ‘hypothetical imperative’ with an extended meaning, to capture the way a common view of 
responsibility boils down to individuality traits like reason, and not necessarily the same way it is used by 
Immanuel Kant to denote the morality of an action on the basis of one’s desires or the practical necessity of an 
action.  A similarly extended interpretation is also necessary when I characterise the African communitarian view 
of responsibility as a categorical imperative in the next section. I deliberately overstate the way an African 
communitarian view of responsibility could be referred to as a ‘categorical imperative’, because of the significance 





6 It is not my intention here to get into the debate of what traditional knowledge is within the African context. 
However, I use it here to denote the kind of knowledge that is passed from one generation to the other orally. (In 
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